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Summary of Interviews

Conducted by the
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities

March 5, 6, and 7, 1975

The following pages summarize by topic the thoughts ex
pressed by the individuals interviewed at the March
and
7 meeting of the CAR. The topics are numbered according to the
"major issues" in the February 4, 1975 draft. Following the
list of topics in the "major issues" paper, are those comments
expressed by the interviewees which could not conveniently be
designated as relating to one of the sixteen issues. On
occasion, a comment of a particular individual may appear under
more than one issue as a result either of that individual linking
two or more issues or of confusion by the interviewee as to the
thrust of an issue.

The following individuals were interviewed:
Marshall Armstrong
Kenneth Axelson
Marilyn Brown
William Cary
Philip Defliese
Victor Earle
John Feeks
Ernest Hicks
Donald Howard
Ralph Kent
Homer Kripke
Robert Mautz
John Meyer
David Norr
Wallace Olson
Joseph Schwartz
George Sorter
Robert Sprouse
William Waxter
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I.

Role of the Auditor

1. There are boundaries to a profession which are determined
by (a) the competence of the professional and (b) the elimination
of incompatible roles. The auditor’s role covers (a) a range of
functions and (b) the position in which the auditor performs those
functions — independent contractor, employee, government worker,
etc. A statement of the auditor’s role will provide a framework
against which to test the pattern that emerges in the discussion
of the various separate issues.
(See discussion of this ’’pattern”
idea in section of this summary on ’’methodology.”) (Mautz)
2. The purpose of an audit is to add credibility to financial
statements.
In addition, users look for improvement in the finan
cial statements as a result of an audit—the auditor should not
allow an inappropriate presentation. Financial information beyond
that necessary to be reported under GAAP should be audited. (Axelson)
3. The Commission must start with the question of why an auditor’s
opinion is required. Banks, the SEC, and stock exchanges require an
audit because of the needs of users for credible and complete inform
ation for making economic decisions. The link between these user
needs and the attest function should be articulated. (Sorter)

4. The value of an auditor's opinion to a bank (as a purchaser
of financial information) is found in the assurance and comfort that
depositors need in order to rely on the financial statements. An
audit is necessary because a bank lives on the faith of its deposi
tors. Beyond that, there is not much value to an audit for a bank,
which relies heavily on a strong internal audit function. (Howard)

5. It is difficult to distinguish between the additional value
users obtain from the auditor’s association with financial state
ments and the value they obtain from the totality of the statements
and the auditor's association with them. The auditor has both a
counseling function with regard to accounting matters and an audit
ing function as an independent reviewer of fair presentation; the
value of each function cannot be separately determined. (Armstrong)

6. One role which an audit performs is to enable smaller com
panies to seek funds in the capital markets.
(Schwartz)
7. An auditor's report is taken for granted; users do not con
sciously feel greater confidence because the statements are audited.
(Waxter)
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II. The Gap Between Performance and Expectations

A. Surprises

1. The view was expressed that users, particularly stock
holders, want to be protected against surprises, such as large
write-offs in the case of REITs.
One means of increasing this pro
tection would be for auditors to report on their assessment of a
company’s internal control. Often, warnings on potential surprises
come from outside the accounting structure. For example, auditors
have failed to understand the growth cycle of a company or industry.
Another means would be to expand audit procedures, even at the cost
of a delay in publishing the financial statements. (Waxter)
2. Based on their experience, auditors should challenge mange
ment to support financial assertions, e.g., depreciable lives.
Auditors should have a role in determining the life that is used,
and at least should report a difference of opinion from management
on asset life. (Waxter)
B. User Needs

1.
Little is known about the types of reliance placed on
auditors. We need to know who relies on the auditor, how they rely,
what use is made of audios, and how an audit increases credibility.
We also need to know the kind of information users need, and This
comes dangerously close to the Trueblood study. The auditor’s role
depends on user needs, and may change as a result of a better under
standing of user needs, e.g., he may become more of an analyst or
interpreter. Financial statements in their present form may not meet
user needs. To discover user needs, the CAR should question various
groups of users as to what their expectations are of auditors’ reports
and the extent of reliance placed on them. Then we can focus on the
audit function itself and the auditors’ responsibilities in carrying
out that function.
(Olson; Meyer spoke to this point also.)
2. The FASB is interested in, and many of their projects
bear upon, the question of identification of users and their needs.
The Board is undecided whether resolving the issue of who are the
primary users of financial statements is important. But it is part
of their study of the conceptual framework. (Armstrong) There is a
sharp difference of opinion on the primary users' identity and the
level of sophistication to which financial statements should be
addressed.(Sprouse)
3. Howard stated that audited figures in financial state
ments are inadequate for a lender. Lenders need additional inform
ation not needed by other users. But this information must be able
to be tied into the audited statements. Brown suggested that finan
cial analysts need more information in published financial statements.
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C.

The Gap

1. The gap between what auditors do and what the public
thinks they should be doing is illustrated by the nature and extent
of litigation, as well as by the commonplace actions of auditors
that are seized upon by prosecutors and made to appear sinister.
Before proceeding to consider an expansion of auditors’ responsibil
ities, the CAR should obtain a better understanding of what the
auditor is presently doing and his present vulnerability to litig
ation as a result of what he does and does not do, i.e., the causes
of the gap.
Even after the Commission decides what auditors’ respon
sibilities should be to meet the reasonable expectations of users,
there is still the problem of how we get the point across to the
relatively uninformed user. (Earle)

2. Most litigation has been a result of substandard per
formance, and has not merely resulted from second-guessing judgments
that the auditor made. Even where the latter has occurred, the cause
could be traced to insufficient consideration given by the auditor
in making those judgments. (Earle)
3. The main cause of the problem is that auditors have over
sold themselves to the public. Auditors have achieved a certain level
of recognition, and this has misled the public, including financial
analysts, into believing the work of the auditor means more than it
does. As a result, for example, users would never understand any
limitations on the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud.
Auditors should back off and inform the public that financial state
ments are not/precise or accurate as they appear, that they represent
judgment, and should be viewed somewhat skeptically. The AICPA
should undertake to educate users of financial statements. The SEC
or the AICPA might create a means of communicating to users some
essential considerations of financial statements - their frailties,
limitations and estimates, and that they are only one source of
information to users. (Brown; Hicks)

D.

The Role of the SEC

Kent suggested that an area for CAR investigation should be
the extent to which SEC activities unnecessarily erode investor con
fidence in the work of the independent auditor. Activities cited
were:
1.

speeches by Commissioners and staff evidencing
a tendency to "shoot from the hip"

2.

injunctive actions initiated with press releases
charging fraud

3.

announcement of intent to publish orders of its
administrative law judge finding bases for
sanctioning a professional
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4.

SEC-mandated quality control reviews

There is an urgent need to have an accounting expert as a SEC com
missioner.
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III.

Present Fairly

A.

Alternatives to Attestation to Fair Presentation
in Accordance with GAAP.

1. The SEC exerts pressure on the auditor to reconcile
disagreements which would otherwise lead to qualified opinions.
The CAR should consider other possibilities, such as having manage
ment say what it wants with the auditor stating what he thinks of
these views. This would avoid forced agreements, as well as the
submerging of an honest and useful difference of opinion which
should be brought to light. The SEC position rests on the mis
understanding that there are right and wrong financial statements
and that the public is not served by airing a conflict between
management and the auditor. Financial statements should be viewed
as a fair approximation of something that cannot be defined pre
cisely. (Mautz)
2. The viewpoint of one issuer (Axelson) was that manage
ment should be encouraged to determine the needs of investors as to
what should be disclosed and then to meet those needs.
(Fair present
ation must be related to the information needs of users.) As a
result of doing this, J. C. Penney has eliminated notes in the finan
cial statements and has substituted an expanded and more informative
text. They had to sort out facts from fancy, wishes, and goals.
Because only faces go into the text, it is all auditable. Also,
because some of this information goes beyond what is usually audited,
such as the full 10-year summary and square footage of new stores,
it has led to an extension of the auditor’s procedures. To make the
data auditable, Penney had to bring such nonmonetary data under the
same kind of controls as in the case of accounting data.

This has implications for the role of the auditor.
He should not determine what investors need to know, but he should
encourage management to identify those needs. The auditor should not
judge what should be disclosed, but rather should determine that the
facts presented are correct and that they are not an unfair portrayal
of the story the company is trying to tell.
B.

Relationship of "Present Fairly" to GAAP

1. The CAR should question the structure whereby the
auditor is loathe to permit violations of the rules (GAAP), despite
the existence of circumstances which would suggest alternatives.
Auditors could use Rule 203 of the Code of Professional Ethics
more, despite the fact that the AICPA’s Ethics Division takes the
position that Rule 203 should not be used to express disagreements
with GAAP. There are instances in which "fairly presented in con
formity with GAAP" doesn't tell the story. Certainly the courts
will not allow mere technical compliance with GAAP if the principles
don't fit the situation. The auditor should be more analytical.
(Mautz)
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2. Cary suggested that auditors should take the viewpoint
of a security analyst, even to the extent of including analysts on
their staff. But Norr felt there would be no need for an analyst
on the staff if the profession eliminated alternatives among account
ing principles. The question of fair presentation relates to this
analyst role. The circumstances of a situation may be such that no
reasonable analyst-accountant would conclude that conformity to GAAP
is sufficient. Auditors must address the question of fair presentation
if the financial statements are merely technically accurate.
3. Kripke, Brown and Norr felt that the auditor has a duty
to take a more active role in the selection of accounting principles,
instead of merely determining the acceptability of principles selected
by management. Kripke further suggested there would also be much less
litigation if this were done. The public expects this from the
auditor; it thinks of him as an ombudsman to protect the public.
Such a stance would not lessen the auditor's independ
ence. In fact, the reality of the situation is that the auditor now
has considerable interplay with management in the selection of
accounting principles. The concept of independence rests on the in
tegrity of the profession and not on any formalistic effort to retain
independence or the appearance of independence. Nor is Kripke con
cerned with the problem of substituting personal judgment for an ob
jective set of criteria (GAAP). The auditor can tell when accounting
principles don't lead to fair presentation.
Conformity to GAAP stul
tifies accountants and prevents them from exercising common sense.
However, Earle acknowledged the difficulty of using a common sense
notion of fairness as an enforceable standard in judging professional
performance.
4. Sorter felt that the concept of fairness is not oper
ational. Accounting principles are merely a means to an end, and
thus should be broad guidelines for meeting certain objectives.
There cannot be an accounting principle for every situation. The
auditor is responsible for passing on the selection of accounting
principles that meet the objectives of financial statements. This
requires judgment, but it is a professional, rather than a personal,
judgment on the relevance of a particular accounting principle to the
objectives.

Armstrong and Sprouse suggested that this approach
would be a desirable goal, but the near-term work of the FASB on
the objectives of financial statements will not provide sufficiently
specific and concrete objectives to permit their use as criteria
for determining fairness. The consensus that the FASB hopes to
achieve in the first six Trueblood objectives will be at too broad
a level of abstraction to be useful to the auditor. Ultimately,
some frames of reference useful to the auditor as criteria for fair
ness will be developed, but not necessarily in the form of objectives.
Mautz suggested that were some set of objectives or frames of
reference to be developed by the FASB as criteria for fairness,
specific reference to them in the auditor’s report would not be
necessary since they would, by virtue of their existence as a
statement of the FASB, be GAAP.
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5. To the public, "presents fairly” means "reasonable."
"In conformity with GAAP" means something entirely different. More
important issues are the elimination of alternative accounting prin
ciples and the enforcement of existing principles. A commission is
needed to air disputes over the application of accounting principles.
(Brown, Norr)

6. The issue of "present fairly" is an ethical problem.
The auditors should not be afraid to say that something doesn’t seem
right, that GAAP are being stretched. There cannot be an objective
standard for fairness. An alternative would be an independent review
group which would operate on a confidential basis that the auditor
could go to for a ruling when a presentation that conforms to GAAP
is nevertheless questionable.
(Schwartz)
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IV.

Detection of Fraud

1. One way to attack the fraud issue is to ask: what types
of evidence are available to the auditor, how can the auditor use
this evidence, how susceptible is this evidence to manipulation.
(Mautz)

2. The detection of fraud is not part of the auditor’s present
role, but would be an extension of that role. (Axelson)
3.
Meyer)

It is management’s responsibility to detect fraud. (Axelson,

4. Users expect auditors to detect material fraud, and the
failure to do so is a measure of substandard audit performance.
(Cary, Brown, Norr, Meyer) But the auditor cannot be expected to
detect all fraud. Perhaps the auditor should not be held responsible
for the failure to detect the first case of each type of fraud that
takes place (e.g., computer fraud in the Equity Funding case), but
after that the auditor should be liable.(Cary) The auditor should
be more aggressive and skeptical with regard to fraud. (Brown)

5.

Some middle ground is needed.

(Meyer)

c. A redefinition of auditors’ responsibility for fraud detec
tion is needed. This is one of the more important issues. (Defliese)
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V.

Evaluating Uncertainties

The financial statements, and therefore the auditor, should not
engage in predictions and estimates. The auditor’s responsibility is
solely to disclose the estimates made by management. He should not
evaluate management’s judgment regarding estimates, and therefore
should not qualify his reports as a result of disagreement with those
estimates. (Meyer)
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VI.

Extension of the Auditor’s Role
A.

Publication of the Report on Internal Control
(the "Management Letter)

1. The report should be made public if it would influence
users’ judgments and decisions. But in general it is unwise for the
auditor to be associated publicly with information as to which
standards do not exist. (Axelson)

2. Analysts and shareholders need this kind of information,
since it provides additional insight to what makes management tick
(Waxter) and shows due diligence to stockholders. (Meyer) But the
CAR must consider the impact on the auditor-management relationship
of disclosing this kind of information. (Waxter)
3. Internal control inadequacies could well be disclosed,
as is currently required for brokerage houses.
(Defliese) However,
because of fear of litigation, the auditor’s report would be bland.
What is needed is a definite oral assurance to the Board of Directors.
(Meyer)

4. The independent auditor should report to the directors
on the quality of the internal audit function. This report probably
should not be made public, primarily because the language would be
"boiler plate." (Meyer)
B.

"Auditor of Record Concept

1. Why not have a function within the company similar to
that of general counsel? This would be someone within the organiz
ation who would put his name on the line and take responsibility for
the reliability of financial information other than the annual
statements. The controller of the telephone company includes his
certification in the annual report. But it should not be the respon
sibility of the audit committee to hire their own independent auditor
to fill this function, since the audit committee should not do things
that the auditor should do. (Axelson)
2. Users feel that the auditor is always at management’s
elbow and is therefore already involved with all financial inform
ation. Ultimately, a continuous audit will take place, so an
auditor’s opinion will be possible at any time, given that users
understand the limits of an opinion on interim data. This kind of
continuous auditor involvement will detect problems earlier and
avoid bad situations, but the auditor's obligation should be welldefined. (Defliese) Schwartz felt that users would understand
levels of assurance less than those which would result from a full
audit.
C.

Interim Reporting

1. A.need for greater credibility of interim information
may exist, but various approaches should be explored.
If alter
natives to auditor attestation do not evolve, the responsibility
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will become the independent auditors',
simply because the need will
have to be filled .
(Axelson)
2. Others expressed doubt as to the value of auditor at
testation to interim data, at least in part because it is not known
how interims would be improved or differ if they were audited.
(Waxter, Sorter)
3. Although interim statements need not be audited, the
CPA should review them and exercise due care. (Feeks and Meyer) Semi
annual or even quarterly balance sheets would be useful. (Feeks)

4. The public expects auditors to take responsibility for
the accounting principles, but not the numbers, in interim state
ments, and auditing standards should require this. The auditor is
already involved with interim statements.
(Kripke) Since he is
involved anyway, he might as well determine the basis of his in
volvement for himself. Lybrand has never had a problem with a review
of interim data in connection with a securities offering, and none is
to be expected if greater responsibility is taken for interims
generally. (Defliese)
D.

Forecasts

1. Auditor involvement with forecasts would add credibility
to them. But there is the whole issue of the quality and variability
of forecasts. (Waxter)
2. See Olson's views re auditor independence in connection
with management services (Issue XV). This same issue comes up with
regard to the auditor involvement in the publication of forecasts.
Such association would not make the auditor any less independent
of the company. If one assumes there is a motive to cover up, the
auditor couldn’t do a second audit of a company. This would then
get into the costs and benefits of frequent change of auditors.
There are degrees of independence; it is not a question of black
and white. (Olson)

E.

Other Information

1. Axelson felt there was no need for credibility to be
added to any financial information beyond the annual report and
registration statements.

2. Expansion of the auditor’s role raises the conflict
of the auditor as an adversary of management vs. his need for
confidential information. It is* questionable if the auditor will
be effective if the concept of confidentiality is pierced.
(Defliese)
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VII. Detection and Disclosure of Adverse Management Behavior
1. There is nothing in the auditor’s training that qualifies
him to pass on management’s moral behavior. (Mautz)

2. Moreover, in today’s environment there is no definition of
moral behavior. Does the issue relate to violations of law, to per
sonal behavior, or to activities as an officer of the corporation?
There are no standards for evaluating management behavior as there
are for the examination of financial data.
(Mautz)
3. Giving the auditor responsibilities in this area leads to
a role so foreign to that which he presently has that it is difficult
to see where it would lead. This is an additional level of respon
sibility which is incompatible with the primary function of auditors.
It would alienate the auditor from management. (Mautz)
4. The auditor’s responsibility in this area should be covered
by the Code of Professional Ethics. (Mautz)

The corporation’s audit committee has some responsibilities
in this area, and the auditor should have some responsibilities to
report adverse management behavior to the audit committee (Mautz),
or to the next appropriate level of management within the company
(Waxter), which can deal with the matter itself.

6. Some compliance matters are so closely related to the finan
cial statements that they should be part of the auditor’s responsibility.
However, for many aspects of management behavior, absolutely no
evidence is available. (Mautz, Meyer)
7. The auditor’s present obligation in this area to the SEC to
violate confidentiality is a threat to his independence.
(Mautz,
Waxter)

8. Acts such as illegal political contributions are not material
to the investor and are therefore not significant, at least until
Burton's views were made known. This is not useful information to
long-term investors, but it should be disclosed because a short-term
market effect may result. (Waxter) But Brown and Norr felt stronger
about disclosure.
It is significant to the financial analyst because
(a) it is a type of fraudulent activity, (b) it raises questions of
the adequacy of internal control, and (c) it reflects on the honesty
and quality of management.
9. The issue is an important one, and the CAR should address
itself to the problem of the auditor's responsibility when he has
knowledge of false or misleading information, beyond the financial
statements, in documents filed with governmental agencies. (Defliese)
10. The FASB discussion memorandum on materiality will touch
on the qualitative aspects of materiality, and will therefore be
relevant to this issue. But the DM will be a neutral document.
(Armstrong)
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VIII. Auditor Communication to Users
1. Mautz: There is a tendency to think of the auditor’s
opinion as the only channel for communication. There are other
possibilities. Perhaps a short book or other type of statement
should be available for the interested public. This would describe
the role and function of an auditor and the limitations of an audit,
and would be referred to in the opinion.
This would be a 6-20 page official document agreed to by
the profession.
It would describe the various services performed by
an auditor, beyond audit, tax, and consulting services. The wording
of the opinion would fit into one of the categories described in the
document and would serve as a description of what the auditor has
done and the responsibilities he is assuming.

2. Financial analysts lack understanding of the meaning of
GAAS. They need an understanding of the audit function and of what
is involved in performing an audit. The auditor’s report should
have a statement of the character of the examination and the degree'
of responsibility the auditor is taking. For example, users want to
know the degree to which it is the auditor’s function to determine
and report on the appropriateness of asset lives or the adequacy of
the bad debts reserve. A general statement such as Mautz proposed
would be helpful. (Waxter)
3. With public companies, users rarely have a need to seek
additional information from the auditor. But with smaller companies,
where a long-form report is often used, there is frequently a need to
question the auditors further. Users are generally entitled to more
information and assurance than they get. (Peeks)
4. The wording of the present auditor’s report is an abomin
ation. Many of the terms are undefined, such as financial position,
results of operations, present fairly, GAAP. (Sorter) Kripke asserted
the dependence of the auditor’s report on the state of the art with
regard to accounting principles.

5. Different financial statements should have different types
of opinions, based on whether the statements are factual or inter
pretive. The auditor can be much more conclusive about the funds
statements, which describes completed events, than about the balance
sheet or income statement, which are interpretive, subject to judg
ment, and require definitions of terms.

Opinions should be differentiated as to the type of state
ment to which they relate. One type of statement, the balance sheet
and income statement for example, relates to process and is inter
pretive and requires assumptions about future events. Here, the •
auditor can speak merely to the effectiveness of the process. The
other type of statement relates to output and is more factual. A
different type of opinion can be given in this case. The auditor’s
opinion should state that each statement is credible and complete,
given the objective of each statement. A longer report will be
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needed to explain the nature of the opinion. Until accounting be
comes more modern, the auditor’s report can be more meaningful by
describing the limitations of present accounting. (Sorter)
6. Any expansion of the auditor’s report will not be helpful,
since it will be written in legalese. (Brown) Armstrong expressed
skepticism that any reasonable expansion of the report could explain
adequately what it’s all about.

7. Because financial statements should be viewed as a frame
work for interpretation of information, and not the information
itself, their timeliness is not important. (Sorter)
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IX.

The Effectiveness of Auditing Methods and Techniques

1. One of the most difficult concepts in auditing is that of
relating a company’s internal control to modifications in the audit
program. (Mautz)
2. The question arose of whether all companies are auditable.
Earle noted the view that ”an audit must be done.” Some companies
are not auditable and should be rejected as clients. Part of the
problem here results from a lack of communication between CPA firms.
Cases exist where misleading information was passed to successor by
predecessor auditors. Earle is amazed at the extent of self-destruction
that results from the failure of auditors to communicate with each
other in solving problems.
3. A multi-disciplinary approach to auditing is needed. The
profession conducts audits today as it has done for decades. Audit
ing should be more analytical, less mechanistic. (Olson)

4. The failure to confirm the contract with Eastern Airlines
in the National Student Marketing case was not something an auditor
would ordinarily think of doing. (Earle)
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X.

The Effectiveness of the Present Structure for
Establishing Auditing Standards

1. Armstrong stated that the accounting profession was able to
withstand the loss of the primary responsibility for the setting of
accounting standards. But the same cannot be said for the respon
sibility for setting auditing standards. He cannot visualize
removing the auditing standards function from the AICPA (although
this is a separate issue from seeking additional ways of enhancing
the enforcement process). It would be difficult to remove standard
setting from practitioners who are on the firing line.

2. Kent raised the question of whether a volunteer group like
AudSEC can now and in the future cope with the greater number of
problems facing the profession in the area of auditing standards.
We should question whether the CASB modus operandi suggests a
solution.
3. The issues paper should phrase the questions about AudSEC
so as not to imply that something must be changed and that the. only
question is what the change should be. A strengthening of staff
could be an alternative solution. (Kent)

The Commission should question whether the SEC should play
any part in establishing auditing standards ant procedures other
than providing input to the body in the private sector charged with
that responsibility. (Kent)
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XI.

The Relationship of the Auditor to Various Parties
A.

Relationship to Management

1. The issues paper should contain greater discussion of
the role of management. A better understanding here would provide a
solution for many of the auditor’s problems. Management should be
defined as the officers of the company, not as the Board of Directors
which is one step removed and is more like users (investors) in its
relationship to reporting by company officers. (Axelson)
2. See Axelson’s comments re issue III on management’s
responsibilities for adequate disclosure. Responsibility for reliable
financial reporting does not rest solely with the auditor. Financial
statement credibility can be enhanced by pressing for greater involve
ment by management in the disclosure area. (Axelson)

3. Present SEC disclosure requirements where there is a
change in auditors are desirable. But it would be unrealistic
to require disclosure of auditor-management disagreements when no
change takes place. (Cary) However, Waxter felt that disclosure
of material disagreements with management would be useful to share
holders .
The CAR should not come to conclusions that would detract
from the fact that the primary responsibility for financial state
ments rests with management. (Defliese)

B.

Relationship to Internal Auditors

1. The CAR should consider the relationship between the
internal and external auditor, a relationship not covered in the
issue paper. Much of the work performed by internal auditors is
directly related to the annual audit by independent CPAs. We should
consider the conditions under which it is appropriate for the external
auditor to rely on the work of the internal audit staff. (Axelson)

2. Howard views the external audit of a bank as an audit
of the internal auditors. For example, (a) their independent auditors
review the internal auditors’ audit guides, (b) their independent
auditors review the internal control system to determine whether an
opportunity for fraud is present,
but it is the internal audit function
which has the responsibility for detecting fraud.
C.

Relationship to Stockholders

1. The issues paper is not clear as to who the public is
to which the auditor has a responsibility. The public is the stock
holder, but the issues paper indicates the engagement is with the
company. The auditor has a greater responsibility to the present
stockholders than to the public at large. But the auditor does not
alone have the responsibility to cure all the ills of American
business. (Waxter)
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2. The auditor is elected by the stockholders, and is
therefore beholden to them and to no one else, especially not to
management. This association with stockholders should be strengthened.
(Meyer)
D.

Relationship between Users and Auditors

As a credit grantor,
Feeks is sometimes in a position to
require an audit, although he does at times accept unaudited state
ments, and to influence the selection of the auditor. He will also
on occasion contact the auditor directly for additional information,
with the client’s consent. He expects the auditor to exercise
discretion in revealing information to third-party credit grantors.
Howard suggested this same kind of user-auditor relationship in the
case of a bank.
E.

Relationship to Audit Committees

There should be greater interplay between auditors and
audit committees, e.g., the audit committee should review the finan
cial statements before publication to insure that the footnotes are
understandable. The auditors and the audit committee together should
serve as a check on management. The audit committee should inquire of
the auditors, outside of the presence of management, whether any
information was withheld from them. (Meyer)

F.

Rotation of Auditors

There should be a rotation of staff, not of firms. This
view was expressed by Meyer, despite the fact that his bank rotates
two firms with some overlap of personnel between the commercial part
of the business on the one hand and the trust and investment part on
the other. This is viewed as a form of competition for thorough
ness between the two firms. But further rotation was rejected by
the bank because of the time it would take a completely new group of
auditors to understand the business.
G.

The Impact of the Fee Structure on Auditor Relationships

1. The fact that in some firms partners' income is based
on fees earned in a particular office or region could negate the
benefits to the auditor’s independence that would otherwise result
from the relatively insignificant impact that the fee from any one
client could have on a large firm. (Cary)
2. Public disclosure by CPA firms of fees received by
category and by office is desirable, since it would provide some
evidence of the extent to which a CPA is bound up with a particular
client. (Cary) Credit grantors would like to know the percentage of
a firm’s total revenue that comes from a particular client.
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3. The auditor’s fee is far more important in determining
the auditor’s independence than his having a direct financial interest
in the client.
(Kripke)
It is too difficult to maintain any armslength position if the financial well-being of the CPA firm is linked
too closely with the client. (Brown, Schwartz)
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XII.

Maintaining and Reporting on the (Quality of Practice

1. Public accounting is inexcusably competitive, well beyond
what the situation calls for. The next generation of managing partners
must be more concerned with technical competence than with increasing
the firm’s competitive position. (Mautz)

2. Two line partners instead of one alone should be required
to sign the audit opinion and take equal responsibility for it.
A second, independent judgment is desirable. (Cary)

3. CPA firms should include financial analysts on their staffs
to review the statements of clients prior to their issuance to insure
that there is a fair statement of the company’s problems and to deter
mine the vulnerable areas in the statements. (Cary)
4. The work of some CPAs is appalling. The CAR should make an
effort to upgrade the standards of small local practitioners. Often
the auditor is associated with financial statements on which he has
performed no auditing procedures. They are usually disclaimed; but
they are on the auditors stationery. A "good” accountant is known as
a result of personal experience with him; the promptness of his
reports, and the fact that he has not been associated with failures
of companies for whom he has acted as a financial advisor. (Feeks
5. Banks; as credit grantors, maintain files on auditors in
order to determine their areas of expertise. They assume the auditor
is good until proven otherwise, but they do review the financial
statements more if they don’t know the auditor. Audits by larger
firms are more comforting. (Howard)

6.

Earle suggested several causes of bad audits:
a. time pressures imposed by the client
b. accountants have allowed lawyers to lean on them
far too much
c. lack of familiarity with the company and the industry
d. rotation of personnel, unaccompanied by independent
analysis of current problems, with mere copying of
prior year's workpaper and report
e. laziness (checking off lists as a matter of routine)
f. failure to follow through on certain audit procedures
such as confirmations

These causes can be corrected by competent personnel,
systematic reviews, and stressing the fundamental objectives of
auditing. There is also a need to get managers and partners more
involved in audits, starting with the planning of the engagement.
The audit must be tailored to the particular company.

7. There is variation in standards between different offices
of the same CPA firm.(Meyer, Schwartz) Branch offices are subject
to different pressures than large offices. Firms should give com
fort to local offices and reduce the pressure to obtain and retain
clients. (Meyer)
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8. The CAR should consider the question of legislation to
protect quality reviews (in house and peer) from discovery. (Kent)
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XIII. The Organization of the Profession for Regulating Practice

A.

Professional Discipline

1. The profession is not served well by the current situ
ation in which disciplinary proceedings are put off until the courts
have reached their conclusions. This procedure implies that we would
rather have laymen than peers determine fault.
2. Present disciplinary procedures fail to take into account
the way the profession is organized. When a partner is accused of
substandard conduct, his firm rallies around and supports him. The
procedure is then, in effect, against the firm and it becomes difficult
to discipline the individual. As a result, there is a need for two
levels of disciplinary proceedings: (a) against the firm—has it taken
steps to provide an environment which is sufficient to protect the
individual, and (b) against the individual—how has he performed within
that environment. The firm has a different set of responsibilities
than do individuals. Action could be taken at either level or at both
levels. Neither of these proceedings should be left to the legal
system. (Mautz)
3. Licensing of firms as well as individuals is troublesome
because of their vast size differences. Licensing of a small firm is
virtually the same as licensing an individual. (Cary)

4. A mechanism is needed whereby the status of a complaint
before a disciplinary committee is publicly disclosed. (Norr)
5. The CAR should raise the Question of whether enforce
ment teeth should be inserted in practice review. (Kent)

B.

Self-Regulation

1. A single source of authority is desirable, rather than
having the disciplinary process fractionalized as at present. (Mautz,
Cary, Earle) Such a body could even set fees, determine standards,
and require peer reviews. (Earle)
2. Self-regulation within the AICPA is not feasible. The
concept itself involves a contradition of terms. Institute policy
is not to proceed with disciplinary procedures while court cases are
pending. Were it to act otherwise, cooperation would not be forth
coming. (Olson) But legislation to protect ethics division actions
from discovery, could affect this stance. (Kent)
3. However, Olson did allow that a NASD-type arrangement
with statutory authority would be feasible and could be effective.
It would have the merit of having judgments made by peers instead of
by bureaucrats.
(Meyer also did not want governmental intervention.)
This would not interfere with the Institute’s other activities, such
as education and membership services. For this kind of self-regulation
to come about, either protection from liability, or confidentiality
of proceedings, or both, would be needed. However, the idea of
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seeking legislation in this area has already been rejected by the
AICPA Committee on Self-Regulation because the major firms oppose
the risks associated with government intervention. The Committee
is now pursuing the possibility of voluntary self-regulation.

4. Self-regulation would be better accomplished through
the Institute than by an independent group which could lose touch
with practice.
It is preferable to use a peer group which is doing
what the respondent is doing. (Olson)
5. The CAR should question whether self-regulation would
improve audit performance more than does the legal climate and SEC
prodding at present. (Olson)

6. An issue which the CAR should discuss is whether the
public interest requires more "outside” members on the AICPA Board of
Directors, or the creation of a public review board or advisory
council for the profession. (Kent)
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XIV. The Effectiveness of the Educational and Licensing Process

A.

Education

1. Higher education has not served public accounting well—
it has served the educators. Instead of creating professional schools
to develop professional attitudes and an appreciation of risks in
volved in auditing, the direction in higher education has been to a
liberal approach of noninvolvement, which has little contact with the
profession. The CAR should give more attention to the education
aspect of preparation for the profession , both at the college or
university level and at the continuing education level. (Mautz) But
Axelson felt it is unfair to expect too much from colleges and uni
versities .

2. One means whereby the profession could enhance the
relationship with academia would be for the AICPA to sponsor seminars
for teachers of auditing. (Mautz)
3. Liberal education is not a helpful preparation for
auditors—there is too little precision and too much permissiveness
in course selection today. A requirement for additional education
after several years in the profession would be helpful. This education
would include ethical considerations and questions of fairness of
presentation. (Cary)

4. The education of accountants should take place only at
the graduate level. This will give the auditor a broader viewpoint
by making his undergraduate experience completely one of liberal arts.
This broader viewpoint, as well as the ensuing maturation ,
will
enable the auditor to deal with clients more effectively, whereas
today the auditor is often overmatched by the client. (Meyer saw
no evidence of this mismatch.) A related benefit would be that
auditors would be less timid in exercising their judgment. Auditors'
present timidity results from both their youth and their narrow
education. CPA firms are attempting to encourage upward dissenting
views by staff accountants. (Earle)
5. The competence of auditors is relevant to the deter
mination of the extent of their responsibility. The profession
needs competent people, and this relates to the entry requirements.
(Meyer)

B.

Licensing

There is no reference in the issues paper to the role that
quality control reviews play in the licensing and regulation of
the profession. Such reviews should provide input to the licensing
and regulatory function. (Axelson)
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XV.

Other Services

1. The rendering of tax services it not inconsistent with the
audit function, nor is systems work. The latter may even be desir
able, in the light of the Equity Funding case. But a broadening of
the management service function is not desirable. (Cary)
(Financial
reports of CPA firms should disclose the source of fees by type of
service. (Cary)) Others felt that the extension of services could
give the auditor more knowledge about the company, which would help
prevent the "big surprise.”
(Olson, Feeks, Norr (with reservations))
2. Several persons (Olson, Kripke, Feeks, Earle) expressed
the view that there is no conflict with regard to auditor independence
between the management services function and the audit function.
Olson took the view that auditor independence (auditing your own
work) is not the basic issue here. Credibility is given to financial
statements by the rendering of a judgment on them by a person
outside the company, and the public doesn’t care whether that out
sider is reviewing his own judgment or even if he did the work himself
and later reviewed it. This issue must be separated from the question
of auditor honesty and integrity, which is a more pervasive issue,
affecting all aspects of the auditor's work, not merely the manage
ment services function.

3. Others felt there is an evident conflict of interest in
rendering management services. The auditor’s responsibility is to
the stockholders, not to management. MS work detracts from the armslength position between auditor and management. (Brown)
Axelson questioned why the CPA is not encouraged to serve
on Boards of Directors of nonclient companies. Kent stated Arthur
Young’s policy on this matter.
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XVI. The Impact of the Current Legal Climate
1. Earle expressed support for a legislative program of finan
cial statement issuance to protect investors, the cost of which would
not be borne solely by auditors. Such insurance would enable a
limitation on auditors’ liability.
Olson would argue against total
elimination of liability; some liability is needed to enforce
standards.

2. Kent felt there was a long overdue need for relief from the
unreasonably harsh penalties of Section 11 of the 1933 Securities
Act. In 1967 an attempt was made to "neutralize ” the SEC as part of a
program to achieve the necessary legislation, but the SEC did not
respond one way or the other. It may be appropriate for the CAR to
support the American Law Institute ’s rewriting of the Federal
Securities Code.
3.
(Kent)

Auditors need protection against barratry and champerty.

4. The issue was raised of whether class actions, encouraged
by the contingent fee system, result in an intolerable exposure for
independent auditors. (Kent)

5. Kent raised the question of whether the SEC should provide
protection for the public interest by establishing net worth or
insurance standards for auditors involved in SEC filings.
6. Kent questioned whether a standard guide for courts could
be established on the question of whether compliance with professional
standards constitutes an adequate defense, absent fraud.

28

Comments on Implementation of the Commission's Report

The question was raised with Olson and Defliese as to what
happens to the CAR’s report. Olson responded that the report
would go to the Institute’s Board of Directors and, if approved
by them, then to council of the Institute. Council may make
specific recommendations , appoint study groups,
or pursue other
alternatives. Defliese suggested that appropriate Institute
action would be for segments of our report to be taken up by
AudSEC.
Board action would be required if we get into legis
lative recommendations.
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Comments on the Scope and Format of the "Major Issues"
Paper in General (February 2b draft)

1. Many of the questions are posed in an "either-or" fashion
which may exclude the consideration of alternative answers some
where between the extremes suggested. This results in part from
the questionnaire-like, check-off or multiple-choice format of
the proposed discussion memorandum. The issues paper should, by
being more open-ended, force the reader to do some original
thinking, to invent solutions. (Mautz)
2. Greater discussion and development of the auditor’s role in
society is needed before raising more specific issues, such as
fraud detection. The transition from the broad issue of role to
the narrower issues was too abrupt. (Axelson)
3. The draft lacks focus. The major phases are too broad, and the
subsidiary issues too narrow.
It would be better to focus on fewer
major issues and use more detailed questions and other material to
illuminate those issues. This would eliminate some of the redundancy
in the draft. (Olson)

4. The draft lacks balance and is not free from bias. It is
written from the viewpoint of the auditor; user needs are not
directly addressed. (Olson)
5. The scope of the draft is excessively broad, implying that
the CAR is concerned with the entire universe.
It will take forever
to resolve all the issues raised. The number of issues needs to be
reduced, particularly by eliminating questions currently being dis
cussed by AudSEC and those of a more procedural nature. The CAR
should focus on the question of responsibility. We could cover
issues that relate to responsibility without studying and making
recommendations on them. (Olson, Defliese, Kent) Defliese was not
concerned by the CAR, as an independent group, going into all the
issues, but suggested that we could make use of existing data and
studies.

6. Issues on the institutional framework or the restructuring of
the profession exceed the charge to the CAR. The Institute is not
looking for specific recommendations on education and regulation,
even though they do have a bearing on meeting responsibilities and
users needs and expectations which is what the CAR should focus on.
It would suffice merely to point to various conditions contributing
to a failure to meet responsibilities, without making recommendations
for ameliorating those conditions; (Olson)
7. The draft suggests that auditors are not meeting their respon
sibilities. The CAR should ask if responsibilities are being met,
and if not, how not. The draft does not identify users and what
they expect from auditors. (Olson)
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8. Topics suggested for deletion from the scope of the study were
Issues IX, XIV, and XV, and certain aspects of VI and XI of the
February 4 draft. (Kent)
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Comments on the Commission ’s Methodology—How to Proceed
1. Mautz expressed concern that the CAR’s decisions be support
able. There are two different kinds of issues being considered.
One involves solicitation of user views and opinions regarding their
expectations. A mere belief as to the public’s views is insufficient.
The other type of questions being raised (e.g., how auditors should
be compensated) are not susceptible to resolution through opinion
surveys. Only logical analysis of the pros and cons, advantages and
disadvantages of the alternatives can lead to supportable conclusions
here. The CAR should identify these kinds of issues and then have
study papers written which identify and explore the various options.
Sharp, clear, specific instructions are needed for these study papers.
2. Mautz further suggested that the various questions cannot be
answered in isolation. Some kind of pattern is needed, and should
emerge from the deliberations and position papers. This pattern
will emerge as our basic philosophy of auditing, and will develop as
a result of investigating a few of the big issues. Suggested as topics
which would be useful in establishing this pattern were the auditor,
of record concept (where does this idea lead us, e.g., to the
notion of the auditor as an employee of the company?) and the
question of compensation of auditors.

Defliese suggested that the key issues are: fraud, auditor in
volvement (such as the auditor of record concept), and responsibilities
in areas beyond the financial statements (such as the "whistle-blowing"
role).
3. There are so few people in academia that are sufficiently
knowledgeable that the CAR should not seek help from them. Don't
waste time with the American Accounting Association. (Mautz)

4. To get acceptance for our report, specific and strong recom
mendations are needed. Sharp conclusions and the data to support
them are essential. The timing is right for a report of this kind.
(Mautz)

5. Mautz does not see public hearings as a useful device for ob
taining information prior to the Commission reaching at least pre
liminary conclusions. For this purpose in-depth interviews would
be. more useful.
(Armstrong noted that interviews are a time-consuming
and expensive way to do research.) But public hearings would be
"desirable as a means of obtaining acceptance for our report.
(Defliese agreed.) The public hearings would be held to defend our
conclusions. This would be a means of placing the burden on others
to defeat the report. The CAR will probably not be able to "sell"
its report as easily as the Wheat Committee report on which there
was no public discussion, and hearings on the recommendations would
be a good way to gain acceptance. This would parallel the procedures
used by the CASB, which holds hearings on standards after they are
promulgated and have been effective for some time.
However, Armstrong felt there was much benefit in the discussion
memorandum and public hearing approach. The variety of witnesses
at FASB hearings turned out to be a good sample of the written
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responses to the DMs. There is also a public relations benefit
from such hearings. Kent suggested the use of hearings at both
the DM stage and after an exposure draft of our report.
6. If the Commission is going to probe specific audit practices,
we should talk to the lower level staff auditor who is doing the
work, and not the partners. We might develop a questionnaire for
200 to 300 senior auditors, asking them to name the ten things that
made them most uncomfortable in their last audit. (Mautz)
7. The CAR should analyze all complaints and decisions of cases
against auditors—whether litigated or not, regardless of outcome—
to see what went wrong. (Cary) This type of analysis was also ex
plored with Earle. Defliese suggested that the AICPA Ethics Committee
could provide information in this area.

8. The CAR should talk to more credit grantors. The New York Credit
and Financial Management Association has a committe
e on association
with accountants, whose purpose is to bring to the attention of CPAs
things that they should be looking for. (Feeks)

9. The use of small task forces on specific issues, along FASB
procedures, was suggested. (Kent)
10. The CAR should establish relationships with key organizations—
accounting and governmental groups and agencies, and stock exchanges.
(Kent)
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I.

Role of the Auditor
1.

This issue is one which may not be approached directly
by the Commission, but one which should be encompassed
in the total study and within the overall recommendations
made by the Commission (Davidson)

2.

It is extremely important to a financial analyst to
have an opinion expressed by an external auditor. This
opinion is the first item looked at by most financial
analysts and has increased importance when there is
a qualification. The importance of the role of the
auditor would be increased and the users would have
increased confidence in his integrity, if he were
required to report directly to the board of directors.
(Mennis)

3.

The report of the auditor is extremely important to
most financial analysts. When a qualification is
attached to the auditor’s report,
this does not
automatically indicate to the financial analyst that
there is a major problem with the company. The
qualification merely gives the analyst additional
information which he can use in his work (Dennis)

- 4 II.

The Gap Between Performance and Expectations

1.

One of the major areas in which this gap exists is
concerning the detection of fraud. Clarifications
must be made by the auditing profession in regard to
their responsibility in detection of fraud. This is
only one area in which the gap exists. The auditing
profession must give consideration to how it can
educate the public as to the auditor's responsibilities
on various issues. (Wheat)

2.

The major reason for the gap in auditor's performance
and user's expectations exist because of the misunder
standing of the determination of values in financial
statements. The fact that the auditor must estimate
and cannot guarantee the values within the financial
statements must be made clear to the users. In order
that we are able to attain fair financial presentation,
it is important that the level of the auditor's
performance be increased and the expectations of the
users be decreased. This can be accomplished only
through the education of the users of financial state
ments by the auditing profession. (Davidson)

3.

A major reason that the gap exists is because
financial analysts do not have enough background in
accounting. It is important that financial analysts
increase their knowledge in accounting principles and
auditing standards. (Bepler)
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III.

Present Fairly

Users of financial statements are more interested in
whether the statements present fairly the financial
position of the company than if they are in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles. This
area of present fairly is one of the most important
areas in which the Commission should direct its
attention. Often times, it is not possible for
financial statements to present fairly and be in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
An example of this is when the market value of marketable
securities is greater than the historical cost. In this
situation, the marketable securities are presented on the
financial statements at cost which is in accordance with
GAAPbut
,
does not present fairly the "true” position of
the corporation.

There have been court decisions where it has been shown
that the financial statements must be presented fairly
and presented in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles.
An important problem that the profession must face is that
in some areas in order for financial statements to more
fairly present the financial position of the entity, the
generally accepted accounting principles must be changed.
In order for the financial statements to attain a higher
level of fair presentation, the auditor must be able and be
willing to exercise a greater degree of judgment than
has been true in the past.(Davidson)
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IV.

Detection of Fraud
1.

It is not possible that the auditor be expected to detect
every fraud that exists within an organization.
The
responsibility which should be attached to the role of the
auditor in this area is that he should be able to detect
where the potential fraud exists. The auditor's responsi
bility is to make sure that the internal control of the
organization is sufficient.
(Dennis)

2.

The auditor has a responsibility for detecting material
frauds but would not be expected by the users of financial
statements to find and report on every fraud that exists
within an organization (Ackerman)

3.

If a material fraud exists, it is the auditor's
responsibility to go to the substance of the problem
and to report on this aspect. The users of financial
statements must be made aware of the auditing profession's
limitation in the area of fraud detection and disclosure.
An important contribution which the Commission on
Auditors’ Responsibilities could make to the profession
is to again look at the need for a change in the auditor's
standard form opinion. (Boutel and Vance)

4.

The financial analysts as well as most users of financial
statements do not expect and do not believe that the auditor
has the ability nor the responsibility for stopping or
detecting every fraud. (Gunn)

5.

The financial analyst does not expect an auditor to find
fraud. The only thing which the users expect of an
auditor is that he be more aware and show a greater degree
of independence in the performance of his normal audit.
(Mennis)

6.

Material frauds should be detected by the auditor. Gross
negligence within an organization should be detected by an
auditor. (Bepler)
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V.

Evaluating Uncertainties

1.

The uncertainties associated with financial statements
often times causes the auditor to issue a qualified
opinion.
In opposition to the position taken by the
SEC most financial analysts do not find immediate
difficulties in using financial statements which
contain qualified opinions. These opinions merely point
out to the analyst areas in which the auditor had to
make substantial assumptions. An important area for
consideration by the Commission would be to emphasize
this situation to the SEC and other regulatory agencies.
(Gunn)

2.

Most uncertainties related to financial statements are
accounting related. However,
the problem of whether
an entity is a going concern or not is an evaluation
which must be made by the auditor. This problem is not
understood by the public. This is another area in which
the auditing profession must clarify its position to the
users. A need exists for clearer standards in this
area. (Wheat)

3.

It is not realistic for the auditor to be able to report
to users all of the uncertainties involved in financial
statement presentation. It should only be his responsi
bility to report on those uncertainties which may have a
material effect on the financial statements. This type
of reporting should be done by footnote only. (Ackerman)

4.

The uncertainty as to whether a firm is or will continue
to be a going concern is a judgment area for the auditor.
If the auditor has any doubt as to the future ability for
an organization to continue, he must indicate this in the
financial statements.
(Boutel and Vance)

- 8 VI.

Extension of the Auditor’s Role

1.

Better standards are needed for interim accounting,
however, not for auditing of the interim statements.
The cost is greater than the benefit which would be
derived. However, maybe the auditor should be respon
sible for a comfort letter on interims.

2.

The "auditor of record” concept as specified by the SEC
is not beneficial. However, there should be some
extension of the auditor’s role so as to eliminate
him from being hired at the beginning of the year,
attesting to the financial statements without forcing
him to stand back and take an overall view of the
organization.
(Wheat)

2.

It would be very useful to the financial analyst, if
the auditor were to lend some type of attestation to
the cash flow projections in interim financial state
ments. The auditor however, should not be responsible
for overall profit forecasts in that these statements
depend on too many variables for which the auditor cannot
be held responsible. (Bepler)

3.

Certainly, the extension of the auditor’s role into other
areas of attestation must be considered in the framework
of a cost benefit analysis. In general, too much cost
would be incurred if the auditor were to extend his role
into such areas as forecast and interims. Much more judg
ment is involved in these areas and should be left to the
public and to the financial analysts. (Dennis)

4.

One of the areas in which the Commission on Auditors’
Responsibilities should take an active role is in
placing boundries upon the domain and responsibilities
of the auditor.
(Hayward Faculty)

5.

The area of forecasting is one which is quite
qualitative. The auditor should not be held respon
sible for attesting to information of which he has
no expertise. An example of such, would be the attestation
to what effect a changing economy will have upon the demand
for televisions. However, the auditor should have a
responsibility to report on information such as what effect
a new building or a plant is going to have on the cash
flow of an organization during the next six months to one
year. (Mennis)

6.

Currently, the way in which line of business reporting
has been defined, in many cases it does not represent
the way in which an organization operates.
This type
of reporting has been misleading to the public and to the
analyst. This is an area in which the auditor should have
a responsibility for attestation. A recommendation made
by this Commission would be of great assistance to the
financial analyst.
(Bepler)

- 9 VII.

Detection and Disclosure of Adverse Management Behavior

1.

In general, the auditor should have a responsibility
for reporting directly to the board of directors.
If,
after reporting an illegal act, the situation is not
rectified, the auditor should not hesitate in resigning
from the audit. In addition to resigning the engage
ment, if the act under consideration would have a
material effect upon the financial statements, the
auditor would then have the responsibility of reporting
the illegal act to the SEC. (Ackerman)

2.

If a particular illegal act reflects negatively upon
the integrity of management regardless of the dollar
value, this act should be considered material by the
auditor. The auditor’s responsibility should be to
If, however,
report directly to the board of directors.
no action is taken by the board of directors, the auditor
must report this act to the SEC or any other appropriate
agency (Dennis)

3.

Any illegal act which occurs within an organization is
a form of breakdown of the internal control system.
For example, if a corporate executive is able to launder
funds through a European bank for an illegal political
contribution, it is quite clear that a similar act
could be conducted in order to convert funds for the
executives’ personal use. This type of a breakdown in
the internal control system is without doubt the
responsibility of the auditor. Therefore, this type
of transaction (illegal acts) should be detected through
the auditor’s investigation of the internal control
system. The auditor should be considered by the public
and by the auditing profession as a quasi-public official.
If this is the role of the auditor, he does, in fact, have
a responsibility to report and to rectify any illegal acts
which have been carried on within the corporation and have
not been rectified "in house.” (Davidson)

4.

Similar to the situation of detection of fraudulent
activities, the auditor cannot be expected to detect
all illegal acts of management. The cost of such a
process would far exceed the benefits. However, when
an illegal act has been detected, it should be the
responsibility of the auditors to disclose this act
to the board of directors. At this point, the auditor’s
responsibility terminates.
It is not reasonable to
attach the role of "whistle blower" or policeman to
the auditing profession. (Hayward Faculty)
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The auditor has a responsibility to report any
illegal acts which he has detected to the board
of directors. In nearly all of the cases, the board
as a whole, will not be involved in the illegal act
and appropriate rectification will occur. In those
rare instances where appropriate corrective action
is not taken, the auditor should resign and indicate
his reasons for doing so, or report the act to the
SEC. (Mennis)

6.

In detecting illegal acts, the auditor should report
and disclose his findings to the board of directors
and the legal counsel of the corporation. If the
situation is not rectified to the auditor's satisfaction,
he should resign from the audit engagement. However,
the auditor must be careful in taking such action as
a resignation, by making sure that he is not making
false accusations and that he is quite sure that the
act that has been committed, does, in fact constitute
one of an illegal nature. Consequently, in such
situations, the auditor should always maintain close
and guided relationships with his own legal counsel.
(Meigs)

7.

The auditors' responsibilities are quite clear when
an illegal act discovered has a material effect upon
the financial statements.
In this situation, it is
the auditor's responsibility to make the appropriate
disclosures so that the financial statements will not
be misleading. However, the auditor should not have
the responsibility for reporting immaterial illegal
acts any further than the board of directors of the
corporation.
(Bepler)

8.

The detection of an illegal act by the auditor must
be reported to the board of directors. This is the
auditor's duty to the public. There have been some
recent cases in the financial area indicating that
silence or the withholding of knowledge may indicate
aiding and abetting. (Wheat)

- 11 VIII.

Auditor Communication to Users

1.

It is not possible for the auditor to be able to
predict all future uncertainties concerning an
organization. However, the auditor should have the
responsibility for standing back and taking an over
all look at a company in addition to determining
whether the statements are in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles.
(This type of responsi
bility is becoming more apparent in some recent court
cases.)

However, the decision in the Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath case has gone too far. Once the
auditor had qualified his opinion, a complete listing
of all the reasons leading to that qualification is
too great of an expansion of the auditor’s responsibility.
(Wheat)
2.

A clear definition of what the auditors’ responsibilities
are, and are not, needs to be communicated to the users
of financial statements. During the last decade, a
great expansion has occurred with the information pre
sented within financial statements. However, there has
not been any change in the auditor’s opinion (his
communication to the public) during this same period
of time. An important role which the Commission could
serve would be to re-evaluate the auditor’s communication
to the users and particularly, his communication through
the standard form opinion. (Stanford Faculty)

3.

Assuming that, or indicating that, the financial state
ments are for the use of the ordinary man is misleading
and has caused a problem for the auditor. The auditing
profession communicates to the public that financial
statements are becoming more complicated, and cannot be
read or interpreted by every individual or user. As
financial presentations becomemore complicated, it must
be understood by the public that the assistance of financial
analysts or qualified individuals becomes more necessary.
(Berkeley round table discussion)

4.

The most important role which the auditor can serve to
the financial analyst and other informed users of
financial statements, is to attest to the adequate and
complete disclosure of financial information.
Once the
financial analyst can be assured of complete and adequate
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disclosure, he is then able to better serve the public.
An important role of the auditing profession is to try
and educate the public, so that they do not expect
or assume that the auditor can do everything. This
type of education is part of the auditor's responsibility
through his communications to the users. (Gunn)

- 13 IX.

The Effectiveness of Auditing Methods and Techniques

1.

It is necessary that the auditing profession arrive
at a set of goals and objectives for the purpose of
setting auditing standards. In order that auditing
methods, techniques and standards can be set most
efficiently, an authoritative framework must be
established.
(Boutel and Vance)

2.

Issues such as the recent position taken by the FASB
on research and development constitutes a real nonissue. The major factor of concern to financial
analysts and other users of financial statements is
not whether research and development should be treated
as an expense or treated as a capitalized asset, but
merely whether there has been adequate disclosure
so that the financial analyst can analyze the
financial statements. The auditing profession must
keep this same point in mind.
(Gunn)

- 14 The Effectiveness of the Present Structure for Establishing
Auditing Standards

1.

It appears reasonable that the auditing standards should
continue to be set by the American Institute of CPAs.
In the case of accounting principles, management has a
great interest and important influence. For this reason,
there needs to be independence in the establishment of
accounting principles. This is not an important factor
in the establishment of auditing standards. The process
has been quite sufficient in the past and immediate
reform does not appear to be necessary.
(Wheat)

2.

An important role in the research methodology of the
Commission should be to determine which of the current
ten generally accepted auditing standards have been
tested in the court. Too often, the standards which are
set by the Auditing Standards Executive Committee only
have the large and large-medium size firms in mind.
Greater consideration needs to be made as to the role
of, and the standards necessary for, the small firms
in the United States. It might even be useful to
consider separate rules and standards for the small
and the large firms.
(Hayward Faculty)

3.

The auditing profession must take the lead in establishing
standards and guidelines for the profession. When a
problem occurs within a firm or within an industry,
it should be the role of the SEC to work with the
company and the auditing profession to determine if the
standards are no longer workable. If this is the case, the
profession, the SEC, and the industry involved must
work together to set workable standards rather than
choosing one company and making a full-blown legal
scandal.
(Mennis)

4.

In the area of establishment of auditing standards,
it is necessary that practitioners set these standards.
However, if the Auditing Standards Executive Committee
were a full-time body made up of members serving for a
period of one to two years, their proclamations would
gain better acceptance from the SEC and others.
(Meigs)

- 15 XI.

The Relationship of the Auditor to Various Parties

1.

The auditor’s closest relationship is to the board
of directors and he should report to that body. (Wheat)

2.

The auditor does not have any direct responsibility to
the public but should report all findings to the board
of directors, and if one has been established, to the
audit committee.
(Ackerman)

3.

The auditor’s primary responsibility for reporting
is to the board of directors. When a problem exists
that cannot be rectified to the satisfaction of the
auditors, they must be more courageous in resigning
the engagement. If the auditor was more willing to
take such action, it would increase his independence
in the eyes of the users.
(Dennis)

4.

The auditing profession must maintain its independence
from the management of the organizations which they
audit. This independence must be perceived as well as
real. One possible solution which the Commission on
auditors’ responsibilities should consider is that a
rule be instituted which would require any change in
auditors to be approved by the SEC.
(Boutel and Vance)

5.

Frequently, the independence of certified public
accountants is questioned and the advantages of government
auditors are discussed. As has been seen in the recent
Watergate scandals, many pressures are put on government
agencies. It may therefore be true that the CPA would
be even more independent than a government auditor.
A very useful way in which the auditor could increase
the credibility of financial statements and aid in
reducing his legal liability would be to fight for
three certified opinions to be associated with the
financial statements. One by the auditor, one by legal
counsel of the client and one by management.
‘(Hayward Faculty)

6.

The auditor is not an employee of management. He would
both increase his independence in perception and in
reality, if it was made clear to the public that he
does not report to management, but reports directly to
the board of directors or to an established audit
committee of the board of directors. Within most
organizations, the management and employees are quite
happy to see, and are quite responsive to internal
auditors, in that, there is a spirit of working together
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in order to improve the efficiency of the organization.
However, whenever the external auditors or the SEC
commence their work within an organization, the feeling
is that both are trying to find a problem in order to
"blow it up.” There must be greater cooperation between
the firms, the SEC and the auditing profession to work
towards better standards for fair presentation in the
financial statements. (Mennis)
7.

The auditor must take into consideration the possibility
of resigning an audit engagement more often than he has
in the past. If this was done more or threatened to be
done more than has been the situation in the past, the
auditor would have a ”larger hammer” to enforce those
generally accepted accounting principles which he felt
would lead to fair presentation of financial statements.
(Bepler)

8.

One of the primary goals of this Commission on
Auditors’ Responsibilities should be to strengthen the
the independence of the auditor. This could be done
in a variety of ways such as direct election by the
stockholders,
addressing the report to the stockholders
and board of directors and by making the use of an
audit committee a requirement.
(Wheat)

9.

The auditors must take a stronger stand when there
is a disagreement between themselves and management.
The auditor must be more willing to resign if necessary.
Even if the financial statements are in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles, but do not
truly reflect the financial position of the organization,
the auditor must be willing to qualify his report.

- 17 XII.

Maintaining and reporting on the Quality of Practice
1.

The major problems within the profession are normally
with small firms rather than large firms. The problem
exists not so much because the smaller firms do not
know or understand the rules and standards, but because
their individual clients have a greater influence upon
the way in which they conduct their practices. (Meigs)

2.

The competitive bidding and the competitive structure
within the auditing profession has gotten out of hand.
What is called competitive bidding in all other areas
of the economy, the auditing profession calls "audit
proposals." (Ackerman)

3.

The competitive situation within the auditing profession
has increased greatly in recent years. The AICPA must
take a leadership role in getting all firms within the
profession to work together in order to reduce the
extreme competition.
(UCLA round table discussion)

4.

Peer group review is not necessarily the most efficient
method of quality control review. Other methods should
be considered by this Commission and the auditing
profession before a decision is made. (Wheat)
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XIV.

The Effectiveness of the Educational and Licensing Process

1.

For many years the standards set for sitting for the
CPA exam have remained unchanged. The fact that such
a small percentage of those sitting for the exam are
able to pass should be an indication that a majority
are not prepared to take the examination. The
accounting and auditing profession must give consider
ation to better preparation for candidates taking the
CPA exam. One possibility for such increase in prepara
tion would be professional schools of accountancy.
The
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities should give
some consideration to the pros and cons of the establish
ment of such schools. (Meigs)
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xv.

Other Services

1.

Many of the services performed by auditors other
than the attest function have proven useful in the
past to organizations. Such services as management
advisory services and tax consulting are best provided
by the auditor or auditing firm which already has a
good understanding of the organization. However, such
functions as executive recruitment are probably beyond
the scope and impinge upon the perceived if not actual
independence of an auditing firm. (Wheat)

2.

All nonauditing services should not be allowed to be
performed by public accounting firms. These types
of services impinge upon the auditor’s independence.
(Hayward Faculty)

- 20 XVI.

The Impact of the Current Legal Climate

1.

This should not be a primary issue of concern to the
Commission. If all of the other issues are considered
and resolved, this issue will be answered automatically.
The increase in litigation against the accounting
profession is not the problem in itself, but is based upon
gaps in the other issues being considered by the Commission.
(Boutel and Vance)

2.

If auditors today are willing to "live in
and drive big cars/' they must be willing
current responsibilities required of them
willing to exercise Judgment in attesting
financial statements. (Davidson)

3.

It is important for the auditor and the auditing
profession to attempt to gain subpoena power for its
members. With this power, the auditor will be in a
stronger position to gain information necessary to
assure a fairer presentation of financial position.
(Berkeley round table discussion)

4.

An interesting development which is currently transpiring
should be considered by the Commission. That is, as
there has been an increase in no-fault insurance through
out the United States, there has been an increase in
the number of "unemployed lawyers." These lawyers now
have more time to work on such cases as medical mal
practice and accountants' legal liability. (Davidson)
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